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
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SECRET1. IRAQ-KURDS

The attempted coup in Iraq on 30 June apparently has not sidetracked the Baghdad government's program to settle with the Kurdish rebel leaders, and may even have strengthened its hand.

Although some army elements are probably unhappy with the government's recent conciliatory gestures toward the Kurds, no significant army units joined the putsch attempt of former premier Abd al-Razzaq.




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Under the prodding of Premier Bazzaz, a pragmatist who is attempting to reduce the tensions in Iraqi political life, the government has put forward a negotiating position that goes much further in meeting Kurdish demands than any previous official gesture. Baghdad is now apparently willing to grant the Kurds a large degree of cultural and administrative autonomy. It also appears willing to grant a slow phase-out of the "pish-margeh," the irregular tribal armed force under the command of rebel leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani. The question of the status of the Kurdish guerrilla force was a sticking point in previous discussions.

A de facto truce which now appears to be in effect in Kurdistan is likely to remain as long as some prospect exists that the talks will succeed. The government at the moment seems sincere in attempting to end the struggle, but mutual suspicions are still strong, and there are numerous points on which the negotiations might founder.

The Shah of Iran, who has aided the Kurdish rebellion in an attempt to complicate Baghdad's internal problems, is displeased with developments and is not giving Barzani any encouragement. Barzani, for his part, is likely to give at least lip service to the Shah's views, since he will continue to need Iranian support should the talks break down.

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2. JAMAICA

Mob violence, caused by existing internal political and social conditions, continues to flare in Jamaica, especially in the depressed West Kingston area. Several clashes between West Kingston gangs affiliated with the governing Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and with the opposition People's National Party (PNP) have occurred in the last month.

West Kingston, a breeding ground for vice, crime, and political unrest, falls within the constituency of JLP member and Minister of Development and Welfare Edward Seaga. Seaga appears to have established a personal rather than a party following in this poverty-stricken area and has enlisted scores of regimented, red-shirted henchmen as his followers.

West Kingston gang warfare broke out on 14 June, featuring dynamite bombs, knives, machetes, and Molotov cocktails. Seaga claimed that well-known PNP supporters were involved in the bombings. On 20 June new disorders occurred and a hostile crowd burned a store on property owned by the Seaga family. Seaga, who has threatened violence in the past, apparently decided to unleash his red-shirted thugs, and additional clashes have ensued periodically between the opposing political gangs.

A lull developed in West Kingston on 28 June when most of the country held parish elections, but trouble soon broke out again. The US Embassy has commented that open violence has become a popular habit that may be difficult for authorities to break.

More gang-land battles are anticipated as both parties prepare for general elections which must be held by 7 August 1967. In addition, serious social problems in Jamaica caused by a rapid population increase, high urban unemployment, and an uneven distribution of wealth will contribute to the tensions. Although the island's few extremists did not initiate the recent disturbances, they can be expected to exploit the situation.

Jamaica's poorly organized and ill-equipped police constabulary would at present be hard pressed to contain large-scale rioting in the Kingston area. [REDACTED]

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3. YUGOSLAVIA

President Tito's ouster of party secretary Rankovic is only the forerunner of a widespread shake-up of the party and government in Yugoslavia and could create serious problems for the regime, notably on the sensitive nationality issue.

By his abrupt action Tito has eliminated a potential threat to his position and demonstrated that he commands the support of the party central committee. He has, however, reopened the question of the succession, since Rankovic had been marked to replace Tito. He has also taken a step which probably will lead to an even more rapid broadening of the ideological gulf between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

It is not clear who now is the heir apparent of the 74-year-old Tito. Party secretary Kardelj's position has been enhanced since he had usually been regarded as number three in the hierarchy, but he has displayed few leadership qualities. Another contender, party secretary Vlahovic, has yet to establish a wide power base. Mijalko Todorovic, who replaced Rankovic as party secretary, is now in a position to vie with Kardelj and Vlahovic, but he lacks a strong personal apparatus.

As far as the USSR is concerned, Rankovic's eclipse will, if anything, lessen what influence Moscow may have exercised in Yugoslav affairs. Conservative in outlook, Rankovic was viewed by Moscow as the most palatable of the Yugoslav leaders. Moreover, as Rankovic's supporters are purged Tito evidently plans to bring increasingly to the fore younger liberal elements who favor economic reform and closer economic collaboration with the West.

The action against Rankovic may well exacerbate rivalries among nationality groups, particularly between the dominant Serbs and Croats. Many older, middle-level party functionaries throughout the country had regarded Rankovic as their protector against the loss of jobs and influence in the wake of economic and social reforms instituted two and a half years ago. The Serbs have seen themselves in direct competition with the Croats for political and economic advantage, and will interpret the ouster of Rankovic, a Serb, as an attack on their own privileges and nationality.

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4. RHODESIA

The Rhodesian Government apparently has refused London's demand that African rights and progress be guaranteed in return for Britain's recognition of Rhodesia's independence under continued white rule.

The British are reported to have offered settlement on this basis to follow Rhodesia's temporary return to nominal British sovereignty. Rhodesia's Ian Smith is said to be unwilling to trust London's promises and to insist that only the white Rhodesians can determine the rate of the Africans' progress.

Talks between the two governments have recessed, but each side is eager to avoid the appearance of a breakdown, and meetings may resume later this month. London appears willing to go on waiting out the results of its economic sanctions, which are having more effect. The sanctions have not, however, weakened Rhodesia's will to resist and, as time goes on and the regime continues to survive, international cooperation in imposing the sanctions is likely to decrease.

Meanwhile, negotiations on how much London should pay Zambia for the latter's participation in sanctions appear to have failed. London offered an economic assistance package of \$20-\$22 million during the period of the Rhodesian resistance. Zambia demanded an open-ended British commitment to compensate Zambia for all economic losses caused by Salisbury's resistance and--fearing just such a settlement as Britain has proposed to Rhodesia--long-term aid to help Zambia permanently sever economic ties with Rhodesia.

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